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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
BP America Prod. Co. v. Burton, 127 S. Ct. 638 (2006).
LAW: 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) does not govern the Minerals
Management Service administrative payment orders regarding pre-
September 1, 1996 production.
FACTS: Under 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A), BP America Production
Company ("BP"), who held federal gas leases, were required to pay
minimum royalties. The Department of the Interior's Minerals
Management Service ("MMS") ordered BP to pay additional
royalties to compensate for the difference between the value of
treated gas and its lesser value at the well. BP claimed that the
additional payment was barred by the six year statute of limitation
under section 2415(a). The district court held that section 2415(a)
did not govern MMS administrative payment orders regarding pre-
September 1, 1996 production. The court of appeals affirmed.
ANALYSIS: After the Court considered the plain meaning of the
terms "action" and "complaint", they held that section 2415(a) statute
of limitation only applied to court actions. In doing so, they rejected
BP's claim that the term "action" in section 2415(a) also referred to
administrative proceedings. The Court also disagreed with BP's
assertion that an MMS payment order constituted a "complaint"
under section 2415(a).
Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that interpreting
section 2415(a) as applying only to judicial actions would render
section 2415(i) redundant and superfluous in contravention.
Furthermore, the Court emphasized the statute of limitations is to be
applied narrowly against the Government.
HOLDING: The appellate court's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT: Limiting section 2415(a) statute of limitation only to
court actions will not make the section redundant. This decision
actually reinforces the rule that the statute of limitations is to be
construed narrowly against the Government.
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Osborn v. Haley, 127 S. Ct. 881 (2007).
LAW: An Attorney General's certification is conclusive for the
purposes of removal.
FACTS: Pat Osborn ("Osborn") sued federal employee Barry Haley
("Haley") in state court. Osborn claimed that Haley, acting outside
the scope of his employment, tortiously interfered with her
employment with a private contractor and caused her to be
wrongfully terminated. She claimed that the Federal Employees
Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 ("Westfall
Act") did not apply, and thus the official was not immune from suit.
Osborn also argued that substitution of the United States for the
official and removal to federal court was not required.
The Attorney General certified that Haley was acting within the
scope of his employment. Osborn then removed the case to a federal
district court, and alleged that the wrongdoing never occurred.
The district court rejected the Westfall Act certification, and
remanded the case to the state court. The Sixth Circuit court vacated
and the court of appeals instructed the district court to retain
jurisdiction over the case.
ANALYSIS: The Westfall Act accords federal employees absolute
immunity from tort claims arising out of acts undertaken within the
scope of their official employment. This act also empowers the
Attorney General to certify that a federal employee sued for tortious
acts "was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the
time of the incident out of which the claim arose," 28 U.S.C. §
2679(d)(1). Upon this certification, the United State is substituted as
the defendant in place of the official and the action is then governed
by the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The Court held that until it was determined as a matter of fact that
the official engaged in conduct beyond the scope of his employment,
the Westfall Act applied. Furthermore, the scope-of-employment
certification was statutorily conclusive. Thus, the Attorney General's
certification that Haley acted within the scope of his employment and
removal of the action to federal court was not controlled by Osborn's
allegation.
HOLDING: The court of appeals' judgment reversing remand of
the action is affirmed.
IMPACT: Regardless of the plaintiffs allegations, the Attorney
General's ability to remove a suit to federal court under section 28
U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) should not be disturbed. Once the Attorney
General certifies that an official acted within the scope of his
employment, the federal courts retains the exclusive jurisdiction over
the case, and that court may not remand the suit to the state court.
Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007).
LAW: The Sixth Circuit's total exhaustion rules are not required
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA").
FACTS: Jones sued six Michigan prison officials. The district court
dismissed on the merits as to four of the officials and found that
Jones failed to adequately plead exhaustion in his complaint
regarding the remaining two claims. Petitioners also brought a
section 1983 suit. The district court found that Jones did not exhaust
his administrative remedies because he failed to identify the proper
respondents named in the prior suit during the grievance process.
Since Jones failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement as to any
single claim in his complaint, the court dismissed the entire suit
under the Sixth Circuit's total exhaustion rule for PLRA cases.
ANALYSIS: Petitioners are not required to plead exhaustion under
the PLRA. The screening requirement did not justify deviating
beyond what was specified under the PLRA. The Court found that
there was no basis to conclude that Congress expressly intended to
transform exhaustion from an affirmative defense to a pleading
requirement in stating that courts should screen PLRA complaints
and dismiss those that did not state a claim.
Under the PLRA, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense.
Thus, the inmates were not required to plead exhaustion in their
complaints. The notion that each defendant later sued must be named
in initial grievances lacked textual basis in the PLRA. Additionally
prison policy did not require that each defendant in a grievance had
to be named in the complaint. Thus, dismissal under the total
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exhaustion rule was an error since failure to exhaust one claim did
not automatically affect other claims.
HOLDING: The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit's judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded.
IMPACT: The total exhaustion rules are not required under the
PLRA. Imposing such rules would exceed the proper limits of the
judicial role. Thus, a prisoner's entire complaint will not
automatically be dismissed if the inmate fails to exhaust some, but
not all, of the claims included in the complaint.
Lopez v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006).
LAW: Conduct classified as a felony under state law but as a
misdemeanor under the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") is not a
"felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act" for
purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").
FACTS: Lopez, a legal permanent resident alien, pleaded guilty to
South Dakota charges of aiding and abetting another person who was
in possession of cocaine. South Dakota treated Lopez's conviction as
equivalent of actually possessing the drug, which is a state felony.
He was sentenced to five years imprisonment. After being released,
the INS started removal proceedings on the basis, inter alia, that
Lopez's state conviction was for an aggravated felony. The
immigration Judge held that despite the CSA's treatment of Lopez's
crime as a misdemeanor, it was really an aggravated felony under the
INA and under state law. The Judge then ordered Lopez to be
removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the Judge's decision.
ANALYSIS: The Court noted that the INA categorizes the illicit
trafficking of a controlled substance as an aggravated felony. The
relevant statutes, however, failed to define the term trafficking.
Ordinarily, trafficking is defined as a part of commercial dealing.
However, commerce is not part of the South Dakota offense of
helping someone else to possess drugs.
The Court found that an offense that was considered as illicit
trafficking according to the INA was a drug trafficking crime under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Therefore, because the South Dakota offense
was not punishable as a federal felony, it did not qualify for removal
purposes.
HOLDING: The court of appeal's judgment is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme
Court's opinion.
IMPACT: There is no indication that Congress meant to change the
meaning of "felony punishable under the CSA" when it incorporated
that phrase into Title 8's definition of "aggravated felony". Since the
applicable statutes at hand did not define the term trafficking, the
Court must look to the term's everyday meaning.
CALIFORNIA STATE COURT
California Ass'n of PSES v. California Dep't of Educ., 45 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 888 (Ct. App. 2006).
LAW: Post suspension or post revocation hearing satisfies due
process of law requirements.
FACTS: The California Association of Private Special Education
Schools ("PSES") claimed that the California Department of
Education ("CDE") could not suspend or revoke the certification of a
nonpublic school that provided educational service to disabled
children without first providing a hearing. The PSES argued that
they should have been given proper notice before any adverse
administrative action could be taken against them. The school
argued they were entitled to a pre-suspension or pre-revocation
hearing.
The court rejected both a facial and an as applied challenge to
statutory procedures in the California Education Code section
56366.6(a), (b), and 5 Cal. Code Regulations section 3068.
ANALYSIS: California Education Code section 56366.6(a), (b),
and 5 Cal. Code Regulations section 3068 provide for a post
suspension and post revocation hearing to private special education
schools that have their certifications revoked by the CDE.
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In this case, the court of appeals rejected the PSES argument
based on the application of factors such as private interest, the risk of
error with existing procedures, governmental interest, and California
Due Process of law principles. Thus, the court concluded that a post
revocation hearing was sufficient to satisfy due process of law
requirements.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment of dismissal was affirmed.
IMPACT: Post suspension hearings satisfy due process of law
requirements. These types of hearings provide a reasonably prompt
method to determine the validity of a revocation where there is a
strong governmental interest, such as protecting disabled children.
American Liberty Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Garamendi, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d
541 (Ct. App. 2006).
LAW: The Insurance Commissioner did not violate the agent's due
process rights by suspending his license under Insurance Code
section 1748(e)(1).
FACTS: A district attorney filed felony criminal complaints against
a bail bonds agent and his company for criminal conduct connected
with the bail bond business. Soon thereafter, the Insurance
Commissioner suspended the agent and his company from
participating in the business of an insurance production agency under
Insurance Code section 1748.5(e)(1). The agent and his company
then filed petitions for writ of mandate to challenge the decision.
They argued that they had a due process right to a pre-suspension
hearing.
The trial court granted the company's petitions however they
denied the agent's petition since section 1748.5(e)(1) only applies to
natural persons and did not apply to companies. The court of appeal
affirmed the judgments.
ANALYSIS: The court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of
section 1748.5(e)(1) which authorizes the insurance commissioner to
immediately suspend the license of an insurer in cases where the
licensee's have been charged with felony criminal offenses. Here,
failure to issue a suspension order would have threatened the
solvency of the insurer, or could have caused financial injury to
others. Furthermore, the information provided by the district
attorney was sufficient to assure that the agent's suspension was not
unjustified. Thus, the court held that an immediate post suspension
hearing would satisfy due process requirement in this case.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment was affirmed.
IMPACT: Due to a substantial governmental interest in prompt
suspensions to preserve the insurance industry and the public's
confidence that industry, an immediate post suspension hearing is
sufficient to satisfy due process requirement.
Doe v. Saenz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 126 (Ct. App. 2006).
LAW: Convicted persons who have obtained certificate of
rehabilitation are entitled to proper notice and disclosure of the
standards used to disqualify them from working in a certain field.
FACTS: Doe obtained a criminal record exemption and worked for
ten years at community care facilities. When she changed jobs, the
California Department of Social Services ("Department") determined
that she had been convicted of a non-exemptible offense, thus,
barring her from further employment in that field.
The trial court held that the Department could not classify a first
degree burglary with a non-accomplice present as a non-exemptible
offense because it was not a crime against an individual.
ANALYSIS: Occupied burglary is not a crime against an individual
when determining if an applicant could seek a criminal record
exemption to work in a community care facility. The Department's
process of notifying those convicted of non-exemptible offenses
violated constitution due process requirements. Additionally, in
treating a second-degree robbery conviction as a non-exemptible
offense - although the convicted person obtained a certificate of
rehabilitation - violated equal protection principles.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment was affirmed.
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IMPACT: The California Department of Social Services is
required to give applicants notice of the basis for a determination of
ineligibility. They must disclose the standards used, the documents
relied on, and the conviction charge. In doing so, the applicant
would be able to adequately challenge an unjust disqualification.
People v. Garcia, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 75 (2006).
LAW: Subsequent criminal prosecution for the same misconduct
could be precluded by collateral estoppel if the agency decision
exonerated the welfare recipient of welfare fraud charges.
FACTS: Garcia omitted the fact that her sons had moved out of her
home, and was convicted of fraudulently receiving welfare benefits
in violation of Welfare & Insurance Code section 10980(c)(2). After
an administrative decision was issued, Garcia claimed that collateral
estoppel barred the district attorney from proceeding on criminal
charges. The court of appeal reversed the conviction on the ground
that collateral estoppel barred prosecution.
ANALYSIS: The court found that the purposes of administrative
proceedings seeking restitution of welfare payments did not greatly
differ from criminal prosecution of welfare fraud. Here, the appeals
court did not adequately consider whether the administrative decision
accurately determined whether Garcia made any misrepresentations
or omission which actually caused the overpayments.
Since the administrative decision did not adequately consider
whether Garcia made those misstatements or omissions, the Court
reversed the court of appeal's judgment. The Court remanded the
case to the court of appeal to determine whether or not the issues of
fraud and perjury litigated in the administrative proceedings were the
same ones litigated in the criminal proceeding.
HOLDING: The court of appeal's judgment was reversed and
remanded.
IMPACT: The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation
in a criminal prosecution for welfare fraud and perjury of issues that
were previously determined in an administrative proceeding.
Copley Press. Inc. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183 (2006).
LAW: The confidentiality provision of Penal Code section 832.7
(making confidential peace officer personnel records maintained by
the employing agency) applies to administrative appeals to county
service commissions.
FACTS: Copley Press requested access to a closed hearing where a
deputy sheriff was appealing from a termination notice. The
Commission denied the request and withheld the deputy's name,
asserting disclosure exemptions under Government Code section
6254(c), (k) and Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8. Copley then
filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief. Copley Press was seeking access to the records and
a declaration that the Commission must hold public hearings unless
closure is justified by law. The trial court denied relief and the court
of appeals reversed.
ANALYSIS: The commission's files are confidential files of the
employing agency according to Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8,
because the commission is authorized to hear such appeals under
Government Code section 3304(b) and the county charter.
The Court found that the officer's identity was confidential under
the section 832.7. Thus, the press has no constitutional right of
access to peace officer personnel records or appeal records that
included the name of the deputy because there is no first amendment
right to this particular government information.
HOLDING: The court of appeal's judgment was reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.
IMPACT: The identity of police officers and records relating to
the officer's appeal are protected from disclosure under Penal Code
section 832.7. This statutory provision is not unconstitutional under
California Constitution Article 1, which gives the public access to
governmental meetings and records.
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ARKANSAS STATE COURT
C.C.B. v. Arkansas Dep't of Health and Human Servs., No. 06-
554, 2007 Ark. LEXIS 68, at *1 (Jan. 25, 2007).
LAW: When challenging an administrative procedure on the basis
of a denial of due process, the appellant has the burden of proving its
invalidity in order to prevail.
FACTS: C.C.B. was placed on the Child Maltreatment Central
Registry for having a sexual encounter with a minor. He appeals the
decision affirming his placement on the registry claiming that the
system used to operate the registry is unconstitutional. He also
argues that the administrative law judge erred in refusing to consider
a statutory defense offered by C.C.B. and also for failing to admit
hearsay evidence.
ANALYSIS: The fact that the administrative law judge ("AL") and
the prosecutor came from the same agency did not violate due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The combinations of
investigative and adjudicative functions are not sufficient to amount
to a due process violation.
The court rejected the argument that the standard of evidence
should have been changed to the higher clear and convincing
standard. C.C.B did not prove that he would have prevailed at the
higher standard nor did he prove that he was denied a specific
employment opportunity due to his placement on the registry. He
also failed to prove that the process was invalid based on the
statutory scheme and the procedure applicable to this case.
Furthermore, the ALJ's failure to sustain a hearsay objection and the
refusal to consider a defense under Arkansas Code Ann. Section 5-
14-102(2003) was not arbitrary and capricious.
HOLDING: The circuit court judgment was affirmed.
IMPACT: The court will not set aside an agency's decision as
arbitrary and capricious unless the appellant has proven that the
decision was made without consideration and with a disregard of the
facts.
LOUISIANA STATE COURT
Jackson v. Louisiana Bd. of Review, 948 So.2d 327 (La. Ct. App.
2007).
LAW: An applicant will be denied unemployment compensation
benefits if the applicant is fired due to misconduct.
FACTS: Jackson signed a drug and alcohol policy when he was first
hired to work as a maintenance man for the Wyatt Manor Nursing
Home. He was later fired due to a violation of drug policy and
sought unemployment benefits. The Louisiana Department of Labor
initially determined that Jackson was qualified to receive benefits,
but Wyatt Manor challenged that decision arguing that Jackson was
fired for misconduct. Jackson appealed the denial of unemployment
benefits, but the court affirmed the Louisiana Board of Review's
denial of unemployment benefits.
ANALYSIS: On review, the court of appeals found that the
administrative law judge heard and fully considered testimony given
during Jackson's sister-in-law's unemployment hearing which
implicated Jacking in the drug exchange at the nursing home.
Although Jackson denied the allegations, he admitted that he told a
resident at the nursing home where the resident might be able to
obtain drugs. This hearsay evidence combined with the admission of
advising a resident and failing to inform Wyatt Manor about this
drug-related activity, collectively, constituted misconduct under
section 23:1601(2).
HOLDING: The Second Judicial District Court's judgment was
affirmed.
IMPACT: There must be sufficient competent evidence that an
applicant is guilty of misconduct before the applicant is denied
unemployment compensation benefits.
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SOUTH CAROLINA STATE COURT
Furtick v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrs.. No. 26270, 2007 S.C.
LEXIS 54, at * 1 (Feb. 20, 2007).
LAW: The Administrative Law Judge Division obtains subject
matter jurisdiction over an inmate's claim when the claim implicates
a state created liberty interest.
FACTS: The Department of Corrections ("DOC") reprimanded
Furtick for possessing contraband while he was in jail. As a result,
he did not earn his good time credit for the month of the infraction
and his work credit level was reduced. In total he lost 43 days per
year due to the contraband conviction. Furtick appealed the denial of
his grievance to the ALJ Division ("ALD"), and the DOC moved to
dismiss the action based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
ALJD dismissed the matter for lack of jurisdiction over the claim,
and Furtick appealed to the circuit court.
ANALYSIS: The Administrative Law Judge Division obtains
subject matter jurisdiction over an inmate's claim when the claim
implicates a state-created liberty interest. Under South Carolina
Code Ann. Section 24-13-210, South Carolina created a liberty
interest in good time credits which could be earned by an inmate.
Here, the allegations involved the loss of sentence related credits
that had not yet been earned. Nonetheless, a protected liberty interest
was still implicated.
HOLDING: The circuit court's judgment was reversed and the case
was remanded to the Administrative Law Judge Division.
IMPACT: Protected liberty interests are still implicated even if an
inmate is challenging good time credits that the inmate is unable to
earn or failed to earn as a result of a rule violation.
